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                        RITTEN BY THE F INGER OF GOD” :  
                          C.S.  LEWIS AND H ISTORICAL JUDGMENT 
 
                                      PHILIP IRVING MITCHELL 
 
 
“I do not dispute that History is a story written by the finger of God. But have 
we the text?”                                           —C.S. Lewis, ”Historicism” 105 
 
“I do not suppose that the sixteenth century differs in these respects from any 
other arbitrarily selected stretch of years. It illustrates well enough the usual 
complex, unpatterned historical process; in which, while men often throw away 
irreplaceable wealth, they not infrequently escape what seemed inevitable 
dangers, not knowing that they have done either nor how they did it.”    
          —English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, Excluding Drama ([OHEL] 558) 
 
 
N HIS OFT-CITED 1954 INAUGURAL ADDRESS as the Cambridge Professor of 
Medieval and Renaissance Literature, “De Descriptione Temporum” [DT], C.S. 
Lewis compared the work of historians to that of flower arranging: “I am less 
like a botanist in a forest than a woman arranging a few cut flowers for the 
drawing-room. So, in some degree, are the greatest historians. We can’t get into 
the real forest of the past” (DT 3-4). According to Lewis, the practice of history 
is an antiquarian display, rather than an axiomatic science. The best one can do 
is attractively exhibit a number of examples from the past to entice an audience 
to examine them closely. Expressed this way, Lewis’s confidence appears rather 
low in the scope, even veracity, of history. He, like all historians, was subject to 
what Erich Przywara has called a “creaturely metaphysic,” a suspended middle 
in which ontological judgments of the nature of what happened in the past and 
epistemological judgments that they happened circle back upon each other 
(154).1 Our present knowledge of the past can never be absolute, certain, or god-
like. Yet Lewis as a literary historian, in actual practice, expressed himself with 
“the rhetoric of certitude” (Tandy chapter 4); that is, his history-writing relied 
on generalizations and assertive judgments, and there are good reasons for his 
 
1 For a further discussion of Lewis and historical judgment, see Mitchell, “‘Raised by 
Implication’: C. S. Lewis’s Studies in Words and Historical and Moral Judgment,” and for 
a further application of Przywara’s suspended middle to historical judgment see Mitchell, 
“Civilizational Sickness and the Suspended Middle: R.G. Collingwood, Christopher 
Dawson, and Historical Judgment.” 
I 
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method. Lewis’s distrust of scientific laws for history, rather than undercutting 
his practice of literary history, existed alongside a basic, cautionary trust in 
representing the past. His methods of history writing included offering an 
overall plot, developing characters and corporate quasi-characters, and making 
analogies with the present to increase readerly sympathy (or antipathy) with 
long-gone cultures. In doing so, despite his strong rhetorical tendency to 
generalize, Lewis did not place absolute faith in his historical narratives. They 
were made to be argued with, supplemented, and even over-turned. To show 
this in his practice, I will pay particular attention to three documents from 
Lewis’s career as a literary historian: 1) his 1945 essay, “Addison”; 2) his two-
day address in 1956 to the Cambridge Zoological Laboratory; and 3) the opening 
introduction to his monumental English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, 
Excluding Drama. But to do this, it will help to examine his overall attitude 
toward historiography because, at first glance, his theory appears at odds with 
what he actually wrote. That they were not entirely so requires a theological 
structure to position his suspended middle of historical and ethical judgments. 
 
THE TROUBLE WITH HISTORICISM 
Lewis distrusted theories of historical change, including Christian 
ones. In 1948, he had enthusiastically written to Christopher Dawson, the 
Roman Catholic historian and social critic, about Dawson’s Gifford lectures, 
which he had sent to Lewis. Lewis had already read the historian with 
appreciation, finding much value in his analysis of political history (Letters 
2.398), and Lewis clearly saw Dawson as a fellow Christian intellectual opposed 
to the spirit of the age. Lewis admired Dawson’s treatment of Hegelianism and 
evolutionary developmentalism, as well as his work “on the Humanists [which] 
seems to me particularly sound” (Letters 3.1584). Yet despite this high praise of 
Dawson’s work, Lewis’s own conclusions about the nature of history, if taken 
seriously, eroded the foundations for such a project as Dawson’s. In October 
1950, Lewis published his essay “Historicism,” in which he condemned the 
pursuit of historical, developmental causes, giving a stipulative definition for 
“historicism” that would have surprised much of his audience (Bebbington 180). 
It certainly surprised Dawson. Instead of decrying the cultural relativism 
associated by many with historicism, Lewis described it as “the belief that men 
can, by the use of their natural powers, discover an inner meaning in the 
historical process” (“Historicism” 100). Lewis had a different, if related, target 
than Dawson. “The mark of the Historicist,” he complained, “is that he tries to 
get from historical premises conclusions which are more than historical; 
conclusions metaphysical or theological or […] atheo-logical” (100-101). In 
particular, Lewis worried about Christian readings of history in an axiomatic 
fashion. Dawson in response argued that historicism (i.e. metahistory) was not 
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the same as idealism, and that German liberal Protestantism and German 
Idealism had muddled things. He gave Lewis credit for opposing such 
philosophical positions that mistook their own philosophy for Christianity, yet 
he insisted that a Christian understanding of history was compatible with an 
Augustinian model of time and society (Dawson 245-53).  
For Dawson, it was clear that metahistory was not universal history, 
and yet sociology could play an important role (307-310). Lewis, on the other 
hand, discounted any pretense to a science or philosophy of history, even 
though he affirmed a general theological shape to its course. History, he held, is 
an interpretive study of the particulars; it cannot be an attempt to explain the 
deep causes or developmental pattern of historical forces. The normal means of 
historians, he insisted, included inferences of unknown events from known ones 
or future outcomes from past ones, though the later were misguided, even if 
allowable. Metahistorical claims could not be advanced without a 
comprehensive knowledge of all historical information. No one can know the 
totality of history because we do not know most of the past, nor has the future 
happened: “The philosophy of history is a discipline for which we mortal men 
lack the necessary data” (“Historicism” 110). To buttress this point, Lewis drew 
an analogy with a departed father’s old drawer, forgotten, then recovered, 
which contained a random assortment of documents, most with no clear value 
to the family. Little historical data is actually recoverable or known, Lewis 
insisted: “I think the real historian will allow that the actual detritus of the past 
[…] is very much more like an old drawer than like an intelligent epitome” (109). 
Lewis, arguably, almost rendered impossible the project of a documented 
natural law, such as what he himself had offered in Abolition of Man. There, 
Lewis had drawn from John Buchanan Riddell’s Encyclopaedia of Religion and 
Ethics to assemble and classify varied moral adages so that he might defend the 
proposition of a universal Tao across historic cultures (Hooper, Lewis 330). In 
Lewis’s defense, the object in his sights was that a predictive model of the future 
could be discovered from the past, not that moral universals are undiscoverable. 
Yet this stress on the moral universal carried with it its own problems in regards 
to historical judgment. In particular, if there is no pattern to history that is 
discoverable, then how does one make moral evaluations as to the past? They 
must be made within history, even if they are acknowledged as a form of 
objective knowledge and as presuppositionally given for all traditional 
cultures.2  
 
2 Lewis asserted that his argument for natural law was neither a strong return to classical 
and medieval natural law nor a covert attempt to introduce necessary theism. His 
argument was a softer proposal: that all moral systems share certain broad ethical 
presuppositions, and that there is no way to critique these moral truths except from within 
the historical system of them (cf. “On Ethics”). As Gilbert Meilaender observes, the moral 
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Unlike Dawson, who saw sociological findings as one of the structures 
of history, Lewis feared a science of history was a threat to human free agency 
and to the foundations of human moral decision-making. Lewis was particularly 
concerned with those using evolutionary theory, and he had as his target not 
only the idealism of Hegel and the dialectical materialism of Marx 
(“Historicism” 103), but also the cyclical theories of Oswald Spengler and 
Arnold Toynbee. Each imposed a model of the totality upon all the particulars. 
In “De Descriptione Temporum,” he spelled out this objection:  
 
I am not, even on the most Lilliputian scale, emulating Professor Toynbee 
or Spengler. […] I know nothing of the future, not even whether there 
will be any future. I don’t know whether past history has been necessary 
or contingent. I don’t know whether the human tragic-comedy is now in 
Act I or Act V; whether our present disorders are those of infancy or of 
old age. (DT 3).3  
 
This is not to say that Lewis did not also affirm a transcendent 
understanding. He insisted that the “primary history” of personal revelation is 
what truly mattered, and it was that fundamental accountability before God that 
rendered any human story significant: 
 
I mean the real or primary history which meets each of us moment by 
moment in his own experience. […] [W]hat MacDonald called ‘the holy 
present’. Where, except in the present, can the Eternal be met? If I attack 
Historicism it is not because I intend any disrespect to primary history, 
the real revelation springing direct from God in every experience. It is 
rather because I respect this real original history too much to see with 
unconcern the honours due to it lavished on those fragments, copies of 
fragments, copies of copies of fragments, or floating reminiscences of 
copies of copies, which are, unhappily, confounded with it under the 
general name of history. (“Historicism”113) 
 
Lewis’s argument from the existential and personal raises many points of 
tension. Formulated, thusly, 1) autobiographical history becomes the ideal 
shape and end of history; 2) the study of the larger past seems limited to what 
immediate truth it can provide the reader or scholar; 3) the purpose of history 
becomes the self (before God, of course) rather than any genuine love of the 
 
truths of the natural law “do not solve moral problems for us; on the contrary, they create, 
frame and shape those problems” (121). 
3 These were not the only instances of Lewis weighing in against axiomatic change. Even 
before his conversion to Christianity, he had trusted Marxist models “in effect, to 
dehumanize man” (Starr 38). 
Philip Irving Mitchell 
Mythlore 38.2, Spring/Summer 2020  9 
other; and 4) as a result, history as a discipline is relegated to the Platonic 
shadows. Ethical and historical judgments, parsed in this manner, would be 
highly relativistic, yet these were hardly Lewis’s own practical conclusions. He, 
too, valued the historical other, and much of his scholarly work was committed 
to helping readers understand a past different than their own culture and time. 
In his A Preface to Paradise Lost, he had clearly warned readers against the 
delusion of “the method of The Unchanging Human Heart.” The gap between 
one’s own context and another historical culture’s cannot be bridged by denying 
any significant difference (62-4). Instead, the variances must be studied and 
understood, “the effort of the historical imagination” to cross the differences 
(72). Lewis’s insistence on historical distance, any more than his treatment of 
historical data as a forgotten drawer, was not intended to end in skepticism. 
Indeed, he wrote with just the opposite goal in mind. 
Despite his suspicion of Christian historicism, Lewis could also make 
critiques based upon his Christian belief. As early as his 1946 piece, “Modern 
Man and his Categories of Thought,” he had connected “historicism” with 
“developmentalism,” and asserted that this was an explicit denial of the biblical 
notion of creation and fall, in which “the very standard of good is itself in a state 
of flux” (64). Historical examples and contexts, for Lewis, are applicable to each 
reader’s “holy present,” which is itself not subject to impersonal laws of material 
or idealist history but to transcendent standards and divine encounter. In the 
same manner, Lewis could draw from Christian eschatology to resist predictive 
history. In “The World’s Last Night,” he insisted that the theory of evolution 
had nothing to do with Christian theology (or with Progress and Social 
Darwinism, for that matter). The final parousia is “a sudden, violent end 
imposed from without,” an end to the play that we cannot read, being that we 
are in it (101). Our not knowing what the future holds offers us dramatic 
freedom: “The playing it well is what matters infinitely” (106). Indeed, affirming 
only a general providentialism kept the historian “from writing a great deal of 
nonsense” and “to get on with the story” (OHEL 148). 
This “getting on with the story” is key to Lewis’s experience as a 
literary historian. Lewis’s flower-cutting analogy underplayed historical 
evidence for most fields of research, except the most ancient and Paleolithic. 
Historians, even literary historians, as often, need to abbreviate event facts, as 
well as distinguish significant ones from what can be ignored. They have to 
summarize, classify, and even eliminate the information they have at their 
disposal, as did Lewis himself. When we read Lewis’s descriptions of the 
historical process, we find we are reading phenomenological accounts, and his 
analogies of the drawer, the floral arrangement, or the personal encounter, as 
well as general descriptions of the history’s limited purposes, are descriptions 
of researching and writing from sources. Because Lewis feared that axiomatic 
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causality undercut human choices in the past, he stressed what little historians 
knew and described a more epistemically cautious procedure.  
Yet this call to hesitancy hardly stopped Lewis from expressing strong, 
even wide historical claims, even if he rejected the cyclical claims of Toynbee. 
For example, he shared with historians such as Dawson a commitment to a 
macrohistorical narrative of the West, one in which the modern world has fallen 
from some measure of the goodness of previous eras. Lewis’s “De Descriptione 
Temporum” is likely his most well-known example of this meta-story. There, 
Lewis was able both to express caution towards historical judgments and also 
to paint, nonetheless, a tragic narrative. He admitted that there was “no Great 
Divide” (DT 3), at least not ontologically, but the means of the divide allowed 
him to consider several possible breaks—between the pagan and Christian 
worlds, between the Dark and High Middle Ages, between these and the 
Enlightenment. Rather than locating the break of greatest importance between 
either the ancient and medieval world, or between the High Middle Ages and 
the Renaissance, Lewis argued that the deepest shift took place in the mid and 
late nineteenth century with radical changes in politics and aesthetics, as well as 
with the general rise of a post-Christian Europe (4-8). He half-mockingly labeled 
himself a living fossil of “Old Western Culture,” for he was able to give some 
sense of this bygone era to twentieth-century students (8-10, 12-13). Of course, 
this was a ruse. Lewis was as much a person of his time as his hearers, but his 
appointed moniker did highlight two aspects of himself; namely, that he was a 
scholar of the literary past who loved it and that he was a Christian, one invested 
in the patristic consensus of Nicene Christianity. This was not to conclude that 
Lewis idealized all things ancient and medieval, but he did establish himself as 
their sympathetic defender and as an exegete of what he believed most 
compatible with Christian truth. At the same time, his history of the centuries 
since the High Middle Ages could pinpoint numerous changes that prepared for 
his nineteenth-century faultline. Lewis’s jumbled drawer, then, could be 
assembled into a rather wide narrative of historical accountability and blame. 
 
THE SUSPENDED MIDDLE 
Was Lewis’s history-writing then at odds with his theory? Only up to 
a point. Even if we acknowledge no set of covering laws, historiography makes 
judgments that link events, and these have ideological frameworks, which was 
the substance of Dawson’s objection: “For the Christian view of history is a 
vision of history sub specie aeternitatis, an interpretation of time in terms of 
eternity and of human events in the light of divine revelation” (248). While it 
may be true that history cannot be written with the same causal confidence that 
the hard sciences claim, quasi-causal analysis (be it that of colligation, 
confirmation, or simple coherency) is at the heart of historiography, including 
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Lewis’s. And these analyses tend to have teleological, and therefore implicitly 
theological, inferences to which they are joined through suppositions, agents, 
and settings. What made this possible for Lewis, then? 
I wish to suggest that the disconnections between Lewis’s theory of 
history and his actual practice are evidence of the suspended middle of 
historical judgment itself, and Lewis’s strong denial of any knowledge of the 
future was intended to safeguard the normal telos of human freedom. 
Theologian Erich Przywara and philosopher Paul Ricoeur have each offered 
phenomenological accounts of human understanding that include the temporal 
nature of persons, and as such, they help sketch the reality within which Lewis 
himself functioned. Przywara’s Analogia Entis underscored that human beings, 
as temporal creatures, possess an openness to the future and human nature in 
history points beyond itself to the eternal (124). Lewis clearly held both eternal 
and teleological definitions of human essence, and the kind of evaluations that 
he practiced—logical, ethical, or aesthetic—asked questions about the nature of 
things. Przywara observed that any method we employ to learn about 
something uses “the greatest possible immediacy to this formal object” and yet 
there is inevitably subjective participation in the matter (133), and Lewis, too, 
understood that in every model there is “something of the nature of the artist as 
well as something of the object” (“Imagination and Thought in the Middle Ages”  
[“Imagination”] 62-63). This extends naturally to the meaning of history. 
For Przywara, the analogy of being was a means of engaging and being 
engaged by the actual world, “an oscillation without end between two 
extremes” of ontology and epistemology (191). Rather than articulating an 
absolute union between a historical description and the actual past or dismissing 
the description as only fictional, Przywara observed that the principle of non-
contradiction offered a humbler assessment of truth (207-10, 216). Lewis’s 
attitude towards historical periodization was a strong example of this oscillation 
from non-contradiction. History can not mean anything, and given plenty of 
evidence to evaluate, what we know forces our generalizations to adapt 
themselves. In turn, periodization is neither equivocal fiction (since it reports a 
colligation of real behaviors and beliefs), nor is it univocal certainty (i.e. it cannot 
claim to know all that can be known or why). Because for Przywara, truth is in-
and-beyond history, it is neither established apart from history nor relativized as 
only history, and this strikes me as very compatible with Lewis. Lewis was 
committed to the project of helping readers appreciate the historical context of 
classic texts, so no conceptual portrait need ever obtain univocal purity, nor 
need it give into equivocal despair; instead, the process of description would 
continue in each generation. For example, Lewis noticed that the pre-modern 
love of rhetoric “is the greatest barrier between us and our ancestors” because 
moderns have no taste for it, yet if that were ever to change, “the whole story 
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will have to be rewritten and many judgments may be reversed” (OHEL 61). A 
creaturely metaphysics, then, suggests a modest path for historical judgment, 
not only in that the truth of cultures is in-and-beyond history, but also in that 
past cultures and events keep revealing newly discovered significance.  
“Change is never complete,” Lewis observed, “[And yet] nothing is 
quite new; it was always somehow anticipated or prepared for” (DT 2). This 
temporal and open shape, Ricoeur contended, is why history shares with fiction 
a narrative structure. Here, too, we can see a practice that Lewis modeled, and 
Ricoeur’s analysis additionally helps us understand why Lewis chose such 
methods. Typical plots and standard characters are framing devices for 
describing historical periods and behaviors, and they assume some measure of 
teleology and essence respectively, even if only as organizing devices. “Plot, in 
effect, ‘comprehends’ in one intelligible whole, circumstances, goals, 
interactions, and unintended results” (Ricoeur 142). Plot types universalize in 
that they merge together contingency and something like necessity, and yet by 
their nature, they offer generalizations in order to depart from them. We 
generalize human action and historical context in order to effect an analogy 
between the past and the present; in this way, they are a narrative form of the 
suspended middle. They gesture towards both the general and the unique. 
Historical periods, which function like quasi-characters as much as contexts, are 
finally unavoidable because it is the nature of explanations to include 
conceptualizations, and they must concern themselves with not only the 
ontological possibilities of universals and particulars, but also the 
epistemological issues of realism and nominalism (Ricoeur 152-3, 226-30). Lewis 
practiced all of this in order to understand the literary past; he, too, recognized 
the necessity and flexibility of historical descriptions. Arguably, then, Lewis’s 
practice of certitude in narrative history fit with the deep structure of a 
creaturely metaphysic that made moral judgments possible, while distrusting 
axiomatic conclusions. His quasi-characterizations of periods as historical 
judgments always functioned analogically because narrative itself is analogical. 
 
 “ADDISON” (1945)—HISTORICAL CHARACTERS AND PERIOD CONTEXTS 
Lewis’s essay “Addison” (1945) stands at the center of his professional 
career and is a good example of his practice, which raised the question of how 
essential periodization is to understanding historical characters. “Addison” is an 
essay as much about Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift, the Tory satirists, as 
it is about Joseph Addison, the Whig essayist, and being so, it offers not only 
literary assessments of the three men, but also the socio-cultural contexts that 
support them. Lewis’s overviews of a period and its shared mentalities make 
ethical or aesthetic evaluation possible, for without such judgments, the 
historian or reader is unable to understand the past at all. “Participatory 
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belonging,” as Ricoeur put it, is one of the necessities for judging an historical 
character’s intentions (194). Lewis took rather complex positions on the writers 
and their conversation. The boisterous, even acerbic sarcasm and fun of Pope 
and Swift were threatening but defensible as school-boy “high-spirited 
rowdiness” (“Addison” 154). Addison’s civil conversation, on the other hand, 
even when humorous, would never be marked by a lack of polish or urbane 
control. Lewis employed such character generalizations to describe differences 
across cultures for his audience. Consider the following passage: 
 
All through the century which Addison ushered in, England was going 
to attend more and more seriously to the Freeports, and the de Coverleys 
were to be more and more effectually silenced. The figure of the dear old 
squire dominates—possibly, on some views, corrupts—the national 
imagination to the present day. This is indeed ‘to make a man die 
sweetly’. That element in English society which stood against all that 
Addison’s party was bringing in is henceforth seen through the mist of 
smiling tenderness—as an archaism, a lovely absurdity. What we might 
have been urged to attack as a fortress we are tricked into admiring as a 
ruin. (“Addison” 156) 
 
According to Lewis, Addison was part of a larger cultural change that continued 
up to the present day. To borrow a term from Charles Taylor, Lewis was 
describing a shift in “social imaginaries,” that is forms of common social 
narrative and metaphor (Taylor 23-30). To offer a context for understanding, 
Lewis generalized a social imaginary in which sentimentality was growing in 
explanatory power, becoming the tacit ideal of a populace, which was slowly 
shifting as to what it had once deemed reasonable. 
Historical periods are certainly made up of practices that divide the 
world in certain ways, and the era brought about by Addison helped shape the 
modern world. Lewis asked his 1945 English audience to consider whether 
being the inheritors of this shift, they had not been corrupted, and he wedged in 
a lesson in rhetoric and its shaping of their aesthetic and historical judgments. 
Words like “archaism” and “lovely absurdity” offered an audience a position of 
moral and chronological superiority, yet Lewis also called them to account, 
however subtly. The gap between themselves and the traditionalism of Swift 
and Pope was far wider, and something had been lost. Lewis did not treat 
Addison or Richard Steele as cynical manipulators; indeed, he took the position 
that they could not have foreseen the entire effect of their work; they were part 
of a change in imaging the world that was wider than themselves.  
It is this kind of open-ended characterization and plot that most easily 
reflects the trade-off between ontological assertion and epistemological 
hesitancy. This historical imaginary is not to be treated as simple causation; 
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“events are singular and typical, contingent and expected, deviant and dependent 
on paradigms” (Ricouer 208). In the “Addison” essay, common human 
experience allowed Lewis to examine various historical changes and yet treat 
them as still commensurable for his audience. The contemporary present was 
alike yet different than the past, and this analogy could be sympathetically 
navigated so that the past was still of import for his readers. Arguably, one could 
reduce Lewis’s connections to that of two historical periods without reference 
to a universal Tao, yet Lewis clearly thought otherwise. A Tao with broad 
categories of moral behavior permitted Lewis to make a point about history and 
human freedom. None of the three men in question were entirely tied to their 
period, yet each was representative of it. Addison, Pope, and Swift were each 
subject to an eighteenth-century stress on “rational piety,” that is a belief that 
the sensible person observes the local faith without any unnecessary internal 
perplexity over dogma. Yet the three men did not respond in the same way, even 
while being subject to their culture and its choices. While Pope, the Roman 
Catholic author of “Universal Prayer,” was the least subject to the pressure of a 
culturally shared faith, and while Swift’s version was still full of Christian angst 
and pain (“Swift still belongs […] to the older world”), Addison’s calm 
acceptance was “historically momentous” (“Addison” 157, 160). Lewis tied this 
change in faith to another change: that of good breeding, and he observed that 
this shift gave the lie to Lewis’s personal temptation to treat his own standards 
of mannerly behavior as universal, and in admitting to this, Lewis was assuming 
that his 1945 audience shared the standard of propriety that arose with 
Addison’s generation. Propriety as a category could be universal yet with 
different guidelines. 
The differences between the three men, therefore, signified not just 
their individual styles and personalities but fundamental shifts that reached 
forward and backward in time. Lewis could argue for historical threads, 
connecting Swift and Pope to the hilarity of the medieval and yet also to the 
narrowness of Renaissance humanism; in turn, he could connect Addison to the 
coming Victorians and to Romantic views of the medieval, and yet still prize 
Addison as a classicist who at times “touches hands with Scaliger on the one 
side and Matthew Arnold on the other” (“Addison” 162). Lewis’s final defense 
of Addison was rather telling:  
 
I fully admit that when Pope and Swift are on the heights they have a 
strength and splendour which makes everything in Addison look pale; 
but what an abyss of hatred and bigotry and even silliness receives them 
when they slip from the heights! The Addisonian world is not one to live 
in at all times, but it is a good one to fall back into when the day’s work 
is over […]. (“Addison” 168)  
 
Philip Irving Mitchell 
Mythlore 38.2, Spring/Summer 2020  15 
Lewis often argued, “To judge between one ethos and another, it is necessary to 
have got inside both, and if literary history does not help us to do so it is a great 
waste of labour” (OHEL 331). Literary history as a practice assesses each era’s 
ethos, seeking to provide analogical bridges to past formative experiences of 
understanding, and the varying works of a period allow for a variety of such 
experiences. They cannot be reduced to one type alone; they may even escape a 
period’s ethos by reaching backward or forward to another’s. Thus, the very idea 
that one can bridge the social imaginaries or historical mentalities raises the 
question as to what periods actually are. If they may be used analogically, do 
they have any ontological reality in and of themselves, or are they better 
acknowledged as simply conjectural tools? 
 
“IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT IN THE MIDDLE AGES” (1956)—PROJECTING A 
PERIOD 
Even in Lewis’s generation, not all historians held that one could 
uncover anything comprehensive about an era. Lewis, like fellow Oxford 
Magdalen scholars R.G. Collingwood and J.A. Smith, fell in the middle ground, 
for he understood that periodization is a model rather than an assured set of 
facts, and yet at the same time, if one is to imagine why things were significant 
to people in the past, one needs a setting by which to assess historical (and 
literary) texts (Patrick 127-8). “[T]hough ‘periods’ are a mischievous conception 
they are a methodological necessity” (OHEL 64). In his 1957 essay “Is History 
Bunk?”, Lewis regarded the end product of historical investigation as a 
synchronic picture: “We want to know how such stuff came to be written and 
why it was applauded; we want to understand the whole ethos which made it 
attractive” (104). The irony is that to make a claim about the ethos of an era, one 
must posit that it existed at some level. However, as Lewis understood, one need 
not advance that a nameable period has (or had) a separate metaphysical 
existence.  
Lewis often weighed in against the ontological reality of historical 
periods. He quoted with approval British historian G.M. Trevelyan’s maxim that 
“periods are not facts” but “retrospective conceptions that we form about past 
events, useful to focus discussion, but very often leading historical thought 
astray” (DT 2-3).4 Yet Lewis also recalled fondly how Trevelyn taught him about 
Walter Scott who taught, in turn, to Thomas Macaulay the historical sense of 
 
4 It might seem strange that Lewis could praise medieval historiography when it lacked 
“the sense of period,” holding that the past is not that different than the writer’s own 
times, yet here, too, Lewis’s concern with axiomatic historicism comes to the forefront, and 
the best readings of the past were moral expressions of the Tao: “Hector was like any other 
knight, only braver.” The saints and kings, lovers and warriors of the past were “friends, 
ancestors, patrons in every age” (Discarded Image 174-85). 
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“feeling for period” (“Sir Walter Scott” 217-18). As exemplified by his “Addison” 
essay, without a sense of period, it is harder for a contemporary reader to bridge 
the divide in understanding, as well as for the historian to write about such 
understanding: “The worst method of all, in my opinion, would be to accept the 
first impression that the old text happens to make on a modern sensibility” (“De 
Audiendis Poetis” 4). The contemporary scholar or reader has to seek proximity 
to the past through points of relational similarity, even when trying to parse out 
the differences; one cannot run roughshod over its historical otherness.  
How, then, given these concerns, could Lewis’s actual use of historical 
periods function so confidently?5 In 1956, for example, he addressed the 
Zoological Laboratory at Cambridge on the topic “Imagination and Thought in 
the Middle Ages.” As Walter Hooper points out, the two-day lecture served as 
a précis for Lewis’s later The Discarded Image (“Preface” viii). Lewis summarized 
high medieval conceptions of the cosmos, including the size of the universe, its 
orderly nature, its hierarchical pattern, its natural and supernatural inhabitants, 
and its triadic organizing structures, the later which encompassed aesthetic, 
ethical, social, and metaphysical elements. Such a project involved 
generalization, as Lewis himself admitted. But to simply encapsulate was not 
enough for Lewis, for he also set out to shape his modern audience’s 
imagination, in this case an audience made up of mostly Cambridge scientists. 
At several points, for example, Lewis offered a different master 
metaphor than the one he expected that his audience held without much 
question. In particular, he wanted to counter an anthropological picture of 
religion as primitive evolutionary residuals, as well as a determinist view of 
interstellar space as an empty and infinite terror. To confront the first, Lewis 
admitted to something of a historical genealogy of certain beliefs, but only to 
seriously discount its value: He conceded that one might trace back the medieval 
belief in angels, demons, and fairies through a long series of written texts until 
one reached an ancient Attic world, and such a world perhaps could be said to 
approximate the pre-logical society of anthropologists, but such a world was as 
distant from the highly bookish milieu of medieval intellectual culture as that of 
twentieth-century Britain (“Imagination” 41-3). Lewis stressed that 
“Characteristically, medieval man was not a dreamer nor a spiritual adventurer; 
he was an organizer, a codifier, a man of system” (44). Admittedly, the world of 
the troubadour was closer to the oral, pre-logical one, but Lewis insisted that 
 
5 Lewis has often been criticized for this: David Lyle Jeffrey, for example, while praising 
Lewis’s coverage of the texts of Late Antiquity, holds that Lewis often projects nineteenth-
century medievalist notions back on to the actual Middle Ages (79-83). Michael Price has 
a similar critique to make of Lewis’s coverage of John Donne (142-3), as does Doris Myers 
of his treatment of Spenser (95-7). 
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they were not at the center of high medieval culture and that current interest in 
them was a product of eighteenth and nineteenth-century Romanticism. As 
heirs to a pre-twentieth-century approach, moderns exaggerated the open-
ended and boundless ineffable as a key to medieval culture, rather than the 
actual practice of its textual and logical actuality. Lewis suggested that it was 
better to understand the systematic and orderly mind of the medieval by paying 
attention to Gothic cathedrals, Aquinas’s Summa, or Dante’s Commedia. Rather 
than pre-logical and intuitive, the medieval mind was credulous yet always 
about harmonization.  
To understand this approach to harmonization, especially when it 
comes to cosmology, a modern has to revisit his or her own inherited image of 
the universe. To understand the medieval imagination, “[t]he motions of the 
universe are to be conceived not as those of a machine or even an army, but 
rather as a dance, a festival, a symphony, a ritual, a carnival, or all these in one” 
(“Imagination” 60). In essence, Lewis treated such a high medieval conception 
as a social imaginary and invited his audience to entertain its analogical, 
emotional, and aesthetic states of being. Certainly, Lewis’s appeals to the 
codifier and the systematizer were ones with which he hoped to engage his 
audience of researchers, yet he also worked to help them envision the medieval 
universe as a “great, complex work of art,” such as those of Milton, Euclid, 
Spinoza, or Beethoven (“Imagination” 49). He urged them to allow for the 
differing analogies that medieval science would have appealed to, such as an 
object’s desire for its end. In doing this, Lewis understood that his scientific 
audience was only too aware of the way we use analogies to describe scientific 
phenomena, and he insisted that the form of the analogy shaped how one 
responds to the universe, “whether you fill your universe with phantom police-
courts and traffic regulations, or with phantom longings and endeavours” 
(“Imagination” 50). 
At first glance, we would seem to be worlds apart here from Lewis’s 
cut flowers or rediscovered drawer. To speak of the medieval era as he did 
before the Cambridge Zoological Laboratory, Lewis had to employ a highly 
overdetermined set of data, and he wove together a rather complex picture that 
reinforced his generalizations. Yet this actually parallels well some aspects of his 
analogies. Because he was a literary critic and historian, he drew from numerous 
texts to build this portrait. He was always aware that the picture he offered was 
colligative, even at points conjectural. That all of this relied on assertive 
simplification did not seem to threaten Lewis, and that such a figure was a 
composite did not surprise him or really endanger his project. He openly 
acknowledged that “most people would now admit that no picture of the 
universe we can form is ‘true’ in quite the sense our grandfathers hoped” 
(“Imagination” 62); rather, the question was which models suggest a more 
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beautiful, human existence. This was not just an admission that the science of 
the Ptolemaic universe was wrong; it was also an admission that world pictures 
are built upon shifts in mentalities, including the modern one. Implicitly Lewis’s 
address had a tragic quasi-plot. He wondered before the scientists present for 
his second lecture, “What our own models—if you continue to allow us models 
at all—will reflect, posterity may judge” (“Imagination” 63). Such an ending 
perhaps only feigned helplessness for a literary scholar like Lewis, but it did 
offer a pungent question. 
By the time that Lewis published his longer version in The Discarded 
Image, he set out a more complex view of science. In its epilogue, he cautioned 
that “we should misrepresent the historical process if we said that the irruption 
of new facts was the sole cause of the alteration” (219). Instead, “when changes 
in the human mind produce a sufficient disrelish of the old Model and a 
sufficient hankering for some new one, phenomena to support that new one will 
obediently turn up” (221). Lewis was not only aware that the details of 
historiography change as new evidence is discovered or as new questions are 
asked, he also understood what Thomas Kuhn would make famous in the 
history of science; namely, that paradigms do alter our reading of the past 
(Martin 346). The question for Lewis was as much one of quality as of accuracy, 
and, being that there can be no absolute human accuracy, which models provide 
some measure of humanity. Periodization, then, could be employed with the 
understanding that it was subject to revision. 
 
“NEW LEARNING AND NEW IGNORANCE” (1943-1954)—HISTORIOGRAPHY AND 
IDEOLOGY 
As both his “Addison” essay and his address to the Zoological 
Laboratory suggest, Lewis did not use the language of historical character and 
period for bridging only the sympathy gap between current audiences and the 
social imaginaries of the past; he also invested historical periods with ideological 
importance, for they are also moral imaginaries, not only in that they function 
as comparative analogies to the present, but also in that they offer genealogies 
of contemporary successes and failures. In practice, as we have seen, Lewis 
could acknowledge the limits of literary period modeling. Throughout English 
Literature in the Sixteenth Century, he provided examples of poets who either fit 
or did not fit the model in question, who functioned as transitions, as test cases, 
as unexplained anomalies, or as variations on a theme—each acting to both 
affirm and give the lie to the model or tradition in question (cf. OHEL 464, 469, 
476, 481, 523, 531). “‘Periods’ are largely an invention of the historians. The poets 
themselves are not conscious of living in any period and refuse to conform to 
the scheme” (OHEL 106). Yet the language of historical periods is still a 
necessary tool if one is to trace the genealogy of influence across time and space. 
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Like his portraits of Addison, Pope, and Swift, Lewis chose to treat writers, not 
only as part of a period, but also as partaking of various periods. The subject in 
question could not only share in one period of reflection but also inhabit older 
points of consensus and anticipate coming ones.6 For instance, when discussing 
the Scottish writer Gavin Douglas, Lewis could place him as standing in the 
medieval and ancient tradition while opposing the new renascentia. Douglas 
shared the medieval “blindness” of treating the underworld of Virgil’s Aeneid in 
Christian terms, yet Lewis does not regard this as “a very heavy” blindness, for 
Douglas’s medievalism partook more of the ancient world than the new learning 
did. At the least, Lewis judged, Douglas was “no further out in one direction 
than many Virgilians are out in the other” (OHEL 86).  
Yet Lewis’s willingness to treat historical periods as ideological quasi-
plots was clearly evident in his introductory chapter, “New Learning and New 
Ignorance.” The title signaled a controversial stance: from the get go, Lewis 
rejected a Whig history of unidirectional progress, and he insisted that a literary 
historian must focus on what mattered to the era in question, yet it was also clear 
that Lewis did not have high praise for the Ciceronian rhetoricians of the new 
humanism or for the Puritans who in some cases followed in their wake. He 
recognized that because British education was the descendent of Renaissance 
classicism, it was difficult for certain readers to entertain a less than exemplary 
notion of the Ciceronians. Indeed, the standard language of periodization—
Ancient, Medieval, Modern—arose from their self-appointed rejection of the 
centuries before them: “And what can media imply except that a thousand years 
of theology, metaphysics, jurisprudence, courtesy, poetry, and architecture are 
to be regarded as a mere gap, or chasm, or entre-acte?” (OHEL 20). Lewis charged 
the humanists with losing the ability to read the ancients for their poetic 
greatness because as rhetoricians they held to a thin standard of Latin style and 
decorum. The humanist rejection of scholasticism and of the medieval romance 
was fundamentally a fear of being considered vulgar, rather than a willingness 
to engage with any seriousness the questions of metaphysics (20-30).7 But, then, 
 
6 The common complaint against The Discarded Image, that Lewis reduces the complexity 
and diversity of the medieval period to a single picture, should be weighed against this 
understanding of Lewis’s. For example, Robert Boenig believes that Lewis’s description 
of the European Middle Ages is too uniform, tending to lump together differing ethnic 
regions, as well as differing classes and social groupings. He charges that Lewis tends to 
project the writings of the intelligentsia back onto the rural and town cultures (29-30). Yet 
Lewis understood quite well that a generalized ethos is subject to numerous individual 
(and subcultural) variations and conflicts, and one suspects he would take such criticism 
to heart. 
7 Donald T. Williams assesses the changes in scholarly responses to Lewis’s picture here. 
Most would agree that Lewis draws a one-sided portrait in need of balance, yet some have 
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Lewis speculated, “Perhaps every new learning makes room for itself by 
creating a new ignorance” (31). Such a statement was as close as Lewis came to 
an historical axiom.  
Lewis also allowed this axiom to shape his overall discussion of the 
period. He made similar observations about high magic, the new geography, the 
first stages of European colonialism, the new political theory of the divine right 
of kings, the changes in modern authorship, and the growth of Puritanism. He 
highlighted these in order to counter traditional and contemporary 
preconceptions about the period. In the latter case, he found himself reflecting 
on the pros and cons of historical analogies: “Modern parallels are always to 
some extent misleading. Yet, for a moment only, and to guard against worse 
conceptions, it may be useful to compare the influence of Calvin on that age with 
the influence of Marx on our own” (OHEL 42). The problematic historical 
analogy was still a useful structure. Lewis held that the first Puritans were 
actually the radical left-wing of their day, both in their doctrinaire passion and 
their insensitivity to the more horrible implications of their systems: “[W]e may 
suspect that those who read it with most approval were troubled by the fate of 
predestined vessels of wrath just about as much as young Marxists in our own 
age are troubled by the approaching liquidation of the bourgeoisie” (43). He 
furthermore suggested that just as the hard-core Marxist is surrounded by 
fashionable dilettantes, so Calvinism had had both its radical center and its less 
serious fringe (44). Again, Lewis understood that such general characterizations 
were not entirely effective when describing actual individuals, and he 
acknowledged that the humanist and the Puritan could often be the same 
person. Both considered themselves the cultural new wave, hoping to sweep 
away the old corrupt standard. Yet Lewis recognized in Calvinism a Zeitgeist 
that shared the deterministic element of Renaissance astrologers and magicians 
and the period’s affective element that placed a high value on the human person.  
Given such strong, even antipathetic positions on the period, it may 
still seem surprising that Lewis held to his basic mistrust of periodization, but 
in light of his sense of the suspended middle of historical judgment, it is not too 
surprising. With good reason, he thought, he mostly avoided the term 
“Renaissance” because it no longer meant for the average reader the humanist 
revolution in learning. All that this really did was encourage modern 
distortions, either in painting the Reformation as “almost nothing but liberation 
and enlightenment” or, in reaction to this, as “the destruction of a humane and 
Christian culture” (OHEL 55-6). Perhaps aware that his own portrait of the 
period had tended in this direction, Lewis apologized that he offered “no model 
 
begun to understand what Lewis was gesturing towards and see his extreme as a 
corrective of an earlier one (152-4). 
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of neatness,” for “it is too neat, too diagrammatic, for the facts.” The historian 
he warned “must beware of schematizing” and must remember that individuals 
could combine opposed positions: “a Protestant may be Thomistic, a humanist 
may be a Papist, a scientist may be a magician, a sceptic may be an astrologer” 
(63).  
Why, then, did Lewis write with such assurance only to undercut it at 
the end? I suspect it was humility. The method of analogical historiography 
would not claim for itself a science of assured predictability, nor even an assured 
genealogy of moral decay or progress. Lewis was only too aware that human 
learning could not with justice claim absolute knowledge, so neither then could 
its historical suppositions and conclusions operate as if they were irrefutably 
certain—a certainty he would not extend to the paradigms of modern science 
either. Of course, Lewis still had faith in human universals and in natural law; 
behavior was basically normative across space and time, even if the particular 
shape of these norms morphed somewhat. Having told a good story with 
arresting characters, Lewis, ever the Christian Platonist, admitted that the 
meaning of the story may be but “pictures we see in the fire.” The more assured 
one is about the Zeitgeist, the less the period has likely been examined (63). Yet 
if history cannot provide predictable laws about the past, present, or future, 
neither should it be reduced to equivocation. The practice of history involves 
some measure of probability and can be argued by a redrawing of the lines of 
historical evidence via counter-narratives and counter-descriptions, and such 
narratives have at their heart assumptions about human nature and human 
purposes. Nevertheless, the lessons that one draws from the past still speak, and 
the models are still applicable. If truth is in-and-beyond history, then such 
lessons should be asserted with conviction, even as one realizes that they may 
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